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Abstract— The i* community has raised several main dialects and 
dozens of variations in the definition of the i* language. 
Differences may be found related not just to the representation of 
new concepts but to the very core of the i* language. If on the one 
hand this is caused by large adoption of the framework in the 
academic setting, on the other hand, it also poses some threats. 
For example, novices have trouble learning how to use the 
language, and besides these inconsistencies prevent i* from being 
largely adopted in business settings. Based on positive results 
from previous work related to conceptual modeling languages, 
we believe that foundational ontologies may present a promising 
solution for this problem. Foundational ontologies may help 
clarifying the semantics of core i* constructs and provide 
practical guidelines for their use. Last, they may serve as the 
basis to propose a normative definition of the framework. In this 
paper, we develop this idea, first by justifying the use of 
foundational ontologies and, in particular, the UFO ontology. 
Then, we raise some problems found in the i* literature. And 
then, we show the outcomes of adopting an ontological approach 
for the specific case of the i* framework. We focus here on one of 
the most characteristic i* construct, namely the means-end link. 
Keywords-i*; iStar; foundational ontology; UFO; means-end. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the years, different research groups have 
proposed variations to the modeling language proposed in the 
i* framework (from now on “the i* language”) [1][2][3]. Some 
come from paradigm shifts, others propose some particular 
type of new construct, and still others issue slight modifications 
related to the core constructs of the i* language. This third type 
of variations mainly appear because the definition of the i* 
language is neither fully detailed nor formal, and researchers 
may have interpreted the same constructs in different ways. 
The absence of a universally agreed metamodel has 
accentuated this effect [2]. 
Two possible positions can be adopted at this respect. One 
may argue that due to the social intention behind i* modeling, a 
certain degree of freedom is convenient and then these slight 
changes should be acceptable. On the contrary, a more strict 
position is to consider necessary the existence of a shared body 
of knowledge on i* with a well-defined meaning. In this paper, 
we align with the second option: our position is that those 
concepts that form the core of the i* language shall be well-
defined and agreed by the community. This is important to 
allow a uniform and consistent use of the language, in a way 
that the community members are able to understand and 
communicate well through their models. Moreover, if it is a 
community objective that i* gains industrial acceptance, then it 
is necessary to provide one interpretation of its core concepts. 
There may be some discussion about where the boundaries 
of the i* language core are, but some constructs like actor, goal 
and dependency, to name a few, seem out of discussion. In this 
paper, we are interested in the analysis of means-end links. 
Therefore, we search for a proposal that may serve as basis for 
a community agreement about what a means-end link exactly 
is. Agreement shall be first at the syntactic level by referencing 
to some i* metamodel (e.g., which type of intentional element 
may be involved in a particular context). But syntax is not 
enough; still different modelers may interpret syntactic-
equivalent models in different ways. We need a deeper 
understanding of the meaning of means-end link. In this paper, 
we propose the use of the UFO foundational ontology [4]. 
UFO has been previously applied to evaluate and (re)design 
other conceptual modeling languages. For instance, we may 
cite the work presented at [4], which formulated a new UML 
stereotype compliant with the findings of this foundational 
ontology. UFO has also been successfully used to design a 
language underlying a Knowledge Management Systems 
methodology [5] and to align Goals and Business Processes 
[6]. Finally, UFO has been employed with success in the 
analysis of alternative enterprise modeling standards and 
languages such as RM-ODP [7] and Archimate [8], ARIS [9],  
BPMN [10],  REA [11], among others,  In all these cases, the 
ontological approach has proven itself useful in clarifying the 
semantics, and consequently, the possible uses of the 
language’s construct. This makes it much easier for the 
designer (novice or not) to apply the language in practice, once 
all ontological commitments have been made explicit. 
Our work proposes the use of UFO to provide an 
ontological foundation to the i* framework. In this paper, we 
take one particular construct, means-end links, as subject of 
research. The goal therefore is twofold. On the one hand, to 
provide a well-defined semantics to means-end links so that the 
i* community may use this construct with a non-ambiguous 
meaning. But on the other hand, we are interested in gaining 
more insights on the use of foundational ontologies in general, 
and UFO in particular, in the analysis of conceptual modeling 
languages. 
The paper is organized as follows. We start by advocating 
for the adoption of foundational ontologies in general, and 
UFO in particular (Section II). We present next a few examples 
extracted from the i* literature which illustrate some 
representative inconsistencies (Section III). In Section IV, we 
present an UFO-grounded ontological view of the means-end 
link. Finally, Section V concludes this paper. 
II. ON THE USE OF FOUNDATIONAL ONTOLOGIES 
A. Ontologies in Conceptual Modeling 
Ontologies are recognized as important conceptual tools in 
Computer Science since the end of the 60s, especially in the 
areas of conceptual modeling and artificial intelligence [4]. In 
the past decade, we observed an explosion of works related to 
ontologies in several scientific communities. This is motivated 
by the potential of ontologies to solve semantic interoperability 
problems (e.g., application and database integration). 
An important point to notice is the difference in meaning of 
the term “ontology” when used, on the one hand, by the 
conceptual modeling community and, on the other hand, by the 
artificial intelligence, software engineering and semantic web 
communities. In conceptual modeling, the term is used in 
accordance with its original definition in philosophy, i.e. as a 
formally and philosophically well-founded model of categories 
that can be used to articulate conceptualizations in specific 
engineering models and knowledge domains [4]. Conversely, 
in the other areas mentioned above, the term ontology has been 
used to describe: (i) a concrete engineering artifact, designed to 
serve a specific function, without (or with minimum) concern 
to theoretical foundational aspects; or (ii) domain models (e.g. 
biology, finance, logistics, etc.) expressed in a knowledge 
representation language (e.g., RDF, OWL, F-Logic or 
conceptual modeling language (e.g., UML, EER, ORM) [4].  
B. Advantages of using Ontologies 
With respect to the analysis and (re)design of conceptual 
modeling languages (i.e. the focus of this particular paper), we 
must understand ontology as in conceptual modeling, i.e. as a 
theoretical body of knowledge or foundation (hence the name 
foundational ontology). Using this foundational ontology as a 
reference model (see Figure 1) enables the evaluation, 
comparison, and identification of correspondences between 
different modeling languages. In other words, a foundational 
ontology (e.g. UFO [4], DOLCE [12], etc.) can be employed 
here as a well-founded basis for: (1) making explicit the 
ontological commitments of each modeling language; (2) 
defining (ontological) real-world semantics for their underlying 
concepts; and (3) providing guidelines for the correct use of 
these concepts. 
 
Figure 1.  Language Metamodel grounded in a Reference Ontology 
With respect to (1), it is our belief that when a modeling 
language does not make explicit the semantics of the constructs 
it applies, it leaves room for dubious interpretation and mixed 
used of such constructs, which may seriously undermine the 
understanding of the models designed using such language, 
also damaging communication between designers of different 
models, and between designers and stakeholders. In other 
words, making explicit the ontological commitments means 
making clear the intended meaning for each of the applied 
construct, articulating this intended meaning with the help of 
general ontological categories. This, in turn, allows for free 
discussions about such meaning, besides applying the 
constructs in a more consistent and coherent manner.  
Regarding (2), it is important to emphasize the nature of 
foundational ontologies. Foundational Ontologies are typically 
founded in studies from areas such as philosophy, linguistics, 
logics and cognitive science. Moreover, being domain 
independent well-grounded formal theories, they can serve as a 
foundation for analyzing general modeling language´s 
primitives and domain specific concepts. For instance, when 
presenting a concept such as “part”, the ontology makes 
explicit the very essence of what parthood is, i.e., regardless 
with we are talking about of parts of cars, organizations or 
human bodies. In this example, a theory such as mereology is 
deeply investigated to provide support for this definition. The 
ontology then helps one to answer: what is a part and how is it 
different than the whole? What are essential parts? Are there 
parts which may be shared among different things or this is a 
theoretical impossibility? Giving real-world semantics to 
modeling constructs enable one a much clearer understanding 
of how to use the modeling language, as well as helps us to 
realize if such language is able to model all the phenomena of 
the world which deserves to be modeled in particular domains. 
A good example is given by UFO-A, which offers is a rich 
theory of parthood relations [4]. Using this theory one can 
make explicit the distinction between, for instance, Essential 
Parthood (Person-Brain) and Mandatory Parthood (Person-
Heart). This formal characterization underlying these 
distinctions allow: a) being explicit about the formal semantics 
of modeling primitives in Conceptual Modeling; and b) more 
importantly, being explicit about which ontological relations in 
reality are  represented by these modeling primitives. 
As for (3), usage guidelines come as a consequence of 
understanding well the semantics behind constructs. With this, 
designers are likely to better grasp in which situation one 
construct is preferable or which design patterns may appear. 
Also, [5] and [6] show how two distinct languages can 
interoperate, having UFO as a reference model, which also 
guides designers on the practical application of both languages. 
One could argue that there are several foundational 
ontologies, so grounding a modeling language with respect to 
one of them does not solve the problem, only transferring the 
discussion to another layer of abstraction. It is true that a few 
foundational ontologies are now prominent in the field of 
computer science and it is also certain that they present  
disagreements w.r.t. some philosophical choices. However, 
despite the plurality of existing foundational ontologies, one 
can rely on pre-theoretical criteria for their selection [13]. For 
instance, for the purpose of providing a foundation for 
conceptual modeling, one can certainly defend the primacy of 
an ontology that takes linguistic competence and cognition 
seriously (as it is the case of UFO) over a revisionary natural-
science oriented one. At minimum, choosing one Foundational 
Ontology and using it as a reference model for a modeling 
language offers the following advantage: it enables people to 
debate their distinct views on the language with basis on a solid 
theoretical framework. In other words, it helps people 
understand where they agree and where they disagree, making 
the debate easier to flow. This is exactly the point which makes 
this proposal attractive in the case of the i* framework.  
C. Foundational Ontologies for the i* Framework 
As already stated in the introduction, throughout the years, 
different research groups have proposed variations to the 
modeling language underlying the i* framework [1][14]. The 
result of such efforts led to a large adoption of i* at least in the 
academic environment, but also in a few industrial settings. 
While this is quite rewarding, the popularity of the language 
also introduces some challenges: (a) people have different 
understanding of the i* core concepts as well as the extensions, 
which makes them to apply the language constructs in various 
distinct ways, inconsistent between each other; (b) novices 
have great difficulties in learning the language, due to 
conflicting examples found in literature; (c) new industrial 
partners resist adopting a framework, given that the academics 
do not provide a clear and uniform standard; and (d) i* tools 
developed for, sometimes, complementary purposes, hardly 
interoperate.  
The problems highlighted in (a), (b), (c) and (d) are typical 
interoperability problems. Going back to the proposal of 
grounding the modeling language on a foundational ontology, 
such approach could enable the distinctions among the 
different i* dialects to be properly formalized. This can assist 
the debate towards defining an industrial standard, while also 
allowing distinct dialects to co-exist, providing that semantic 
interoperability is guaranteed by using the same formalization 
model. 
D. The UFO Foundational Ontology 
It has been aforementioned that several foundational 
ontologies exist today. A few examples of some prominent 
work are GFO [15], DOLCE [12], OntoClean [16] and BWW 
[17]. UFO started as a unification of the GFO (Generalized 
Formalized Ontology) and the Top-Level ontology of 
universals underlying OntoClean. However, as shown in [4], 
there are a number of problematic issues related the specific 
objective of developing ontological foundations for general 
conceptual modeling languages (e.g., EER, UML, ORM) 
which were not covered in a satisfactory manner by existing 
foundational ontologies such as GFO, DOLCE or OntoClean. 
To cite few examples, in contrast with BWW, it elaborates on 
social concepts, and on a cognitive and linguistic view of 
events [18]; in contrast with BWW and GFO, it elaborates on 
multitude of finer-grained categories of classifiers which are 
fundamental for conceptual modeling [4]; in contrast with 
OntoClean, it targets other types of non-taxonomic relations 
and in contrast with DOLCE, it develops a theory of material 
relations which proved to be of great significance in addressing 
a number of phenomena in conceptual modeling. Thus, with 
the purpose of developing a foundation for addressing the 
specific phenomena of concern in conceptual modeling, UFO 
has been developed into a full-blown reference ontology based 
on a number of theories from Formal Ontology, Philosophical 
Logics, Philosophy of Language, Linguistics and Cognitive 
Psychology. This ontology is presented in depth and formally 
characterized in [4], for the case of UFO-A, and discussed in 
more details in [18], for the case of UFO-B and C.  
For the aforementioned reasons, we have chosen UFO here 
as our foundational ontology for the analysis of the i* 
framework.    
E. Analyzing a Modeling Language by applying a 
Foundational Ontology 
Guizzardi [4] provides a framework for evaluating 
modeling languages. This framework verifies how clear and 
expressive a language is, by focusing on its notation, but also 
evaluates how well this language is able to represent the state 
of affairs for which it is proposed (also referred in this work as 
domain appropriateness and comprehensibility 
appropriateness). 
“The domain appropriateness of a language is a measure 
of the suitability of a language to model phenomena in a given 
domain, or in other words, of its truthfulness of a language to a 
given domain reality. (...) Comprehensibility appropriateness 
refers to how easy is for a user a given language to recognize 
what that language’s constructs mean in terms of domain 
concepts and, how easy is to understand, communicate and 
reason with the specifications produced in that language.” 
([4], pg. 28). 
The proposed framework is based on the construction of an 
ontology to describe the conceptual domain of discourse. This 
ontology is then used as a type of ‘mirror’ for the modeling 
language, i.e. for verifying how well this modeling language is 
able to represent the concepts and relations represented in the 
ontology. This verification results is a measure of the quality of 
the domain appropriateness of the given language. The ideal 
situation is that in which the modeling language metamodel is 
isomorphic to the reference ontology, i.e. there is a one-to-one 
mapping between the concepts underlying the language and the 
concepts defined in the ontology. For an in depth discussion on 
this topic, one should refer to [4].  
Figure 2 exemplifies how the method enables the 
identification of four undesirable properties in the modeling 
language, namely: construct overload, construct excess, 
construct redundancy, and language incompleteness. 
 
Figure 2.  Inconsistencies in a language may be found when grounding its 
metamodel with respect to a reference ontology 
Construct overload generally means having a single 
language construct representing two or more ontological 
constructs. As stated by Guizzardi ([4], pg. 31) citing [17], 
“Construct overload is considered an undesirable property of 
a modeling language since it causes ambiguity and, hence, 
undermines clarity. When a construct overload exists, users 
have to bring additional knowledge not contained in the 
specification to understand the phenomena which are being 
represented.” 
To be sound, every construct of the language should have 
an interpretation in terms of the domain conceptualization. As 
discussed in [4], if the language includes constructs devoid of a 
natural ontological interpretation, readers will assign their own 
individual interpretation to it, over which the language 
designers have no control. This, in turns, opens the possibility 
for non-shared interpretations among people communicating 
with the language and, hence, to semantic interoperability 
problems. Having one construct that does not map to any 
ontological concept is known as construct excess. The presence 
of this extra construct undermines the understanding of the 
specification. In other words, a specification is clear if the 
reader is able to link the language constructs to the entities of 
the domain of discourse. Consequently, only the entities of this 
domain (represented in the domain ontology) should be 
modeled with the use of language constructs. 
A language should possess only one construct to represent 
each phenomenon in the domain or discourse (i.e. each entity 
in the domain ontology), thus avoiding construct redundancy. 
The same conceptual entity being represented by two or more 
constructs in a specification, consequently adds confusion to 
the meaning of the model. A reader may ask himself, for 
example, if the two constructs are actually the same or if there 
is any semantic distinction between them. Besides turning 
more difficult the understanding of specifications, this adds 
unnecessary complexity to the modeling language. In general, 
when facing redundancy, designers tend to ascribe slightly 
different meanings to the redundant constructs, which may not 
be fully understood by the model readers. 
A modeling language is said to be complete if every 
concept in a domain conceptualization is covered by at least 
one modeling construct of the language. This is directly linked 
to the expressivity of the given language. In other words, if a 
language is incomplete, it fails to represent all phenomena in 
the given domain of discourse. The result of this 
incompleteness is either an incomplete specifications or 
construct overload, which are both undesirable for deteriorating 
the clarity of the specifications produced with the given 
language. 
III. THE I* CASE: EXAMPLES FROM LITERATURE 
In this section we analyze in detail the current landscape 
with respect to language variations proposed by the i* 
community. In previous work we have undertaken several 
reviews that we use as our baseline for his analysis. In [19] we 
presented a thorough comparative analysis of the three main 
streamlines of the i* language, namely the seminal i* [20] and 
its evolution in the i* wiki, GRL [21] and the Tropos’ language 
[22]. In three recent papers [1][14][23] we located and 
analyzed papers on i* published in 10 selected venues in the 
last 5 years, including moreover the recent i* book [24]. We 
found 146 papers that were analyzed under different 
perspectives in each of those works: model interoperability 
[14], framework diversity [1] and language variations [23]. 
From this last perspective, that is the one of interest in this 
paper, we filtered the papers removing those that tackle 
different issues other than language (e.g., analysis techniques, 
visualization issues, etc.) and we selected 63 papers that were 
categorized in terms of addition, removal or modification of 
existing i* constructs (see Table I). 
TABLE I.  VARIATIONS PROPOSED BY THE I* COMMUNITY IN THE LAST 5 
YEARS (SELECTED VENUES ONLY). EACH PAPER INCREMENTS EACH COLUMN 











  New 4 24 10 21 21 
  Removed 8 5 2 1 0 
  Changed 3 1 1 36 43 
 
In this section, we present a few examples extracted from 
this literature review, which illustrate some of the 
inconsistencies we encountered. We particularly focus on the 
use of the means-end link. As this use is frequently mixed up 
with other relation types, examples also include cases of 
contributions and decompositions. 
A. The use of means-end links 
Different i* variants [23], whilst respecting the main idea of 
the means-end link (ME-link for short) as “a means to attain an 
end”, state their own (if any) restrictions (see Table II). In his 
seminal proposal, Yu stated about ME-links: “the end can be a 
goal, task, resource or softgoal, whereas the means is usually a 
task”. The term “usually” was dropped in the evolution of this 
variant, the i* wiki version, where not just the means were 
completely restricted to tasks (i.e., not usually but always) but 
also the end was restricted to goals. The guidelines in the wiki 
state that other types of links are available for different 
combinations of intentional element’s types. Whilst being clear 
in terms of what types are permitted, this definition is very 
restrictive. 
Another issue to remark is the relationship to the concept of 
“OR-decomposition”. The concept of ME-link is close to that 
of OR-decomposition, in the sense that the source elements of 
the link (either “means” or “sub-elements”) are interpreted in a 
kind of logical OR relationship with respect to the target. In 
fact, several proposals seem to not distinguish these two 
concepts, e.g. GRL has eliminated means-end links and just 
OR-decomposition (in addition to AND- and XOR-
decomposition) is offered. On the contrary, some Tropos 
definitions are using both constructs in its language, like in the 
following quotations: “in an OR decomposition the subgoals 
represent alternative ways to achieve the root goal”, and “the 
means/end relationship specifies a means (in terms of a goal, a 
plan or a resource) to satisfy the goal”; whilst others Tropos’ 
papers are closer to the classical Yu’s proposal or even whilst 
providing both constructs, it is not clear which is the real 
difference. 
It is also worth to remark that existing works do not seem to 
address much the relationship between ME-links and actor 
links. In our ongoing work analyzing the meaning of the is-a 
actor link, we have mainly investigated if new means can be 
added to an end that is inherited in a subactor. To do so, a 
question needs to be answered: is a means-end relation always 
complete, is it always incomplete, or if none of the former, is it 
possible to distinguish an incomplete relation from a complete 
one? 
Last, a final issue is whether the means for an end are to be 
considered exclusive or not (XOR vs. OR). For instance, Yu’s 
thesis does not explicitly state this interpretation, but from the 
examples the means seem to be always exclusive. Just one 
analyzed proposal (GRL) allows explicitly declaring the type 
of logical operator, but we remind that GRL is not 
distinguishing among ME-links and OR-/XOR-
decompositions. 
TABLE II.  SUMMARY OF THE STATE OF THE ART. 




Yu’s thesis Means-end link (usually) T -> G 
| SG | T | R 
Not stated 
i* wiki Means-end link T -> G Not stated 
Tropos Means-end link G | T | R -> G Not stated 
 OR-decomposition G -> G Not stated 
GRL OR-decomposition G | SG | T | R -> 




B. Examples of uses of means-end links 
This subsection is dedicated to raise some issues present in 
literature, regarding the practical use of ME-links. We will see 
that two situations arise: discrepancies in the interpretation of 
ME-links, and modeling errors. 
Logical combination of means. As already stated, an 
analysis of the existing literature reveals that the use of the 
ME-links is neither uniform, nor consistent. In general, we note 
that distinct researchers infer their own particular meaning for 
the i* constructs, according to the needs of their current work. 
Even sometimes, the same author applies ME-links with 
different semantics in distinct contexts or publications. For 
instance, Figures 3 and 41 present two models in which the 
ME-link is applied. By the description found in [20], in figure 
3, the tasks lease, buy and borrow are three alternative ways 
to achieve the goal has (item). Thus, the means are related 
through an XOR-type relation. This is clear by the statement in 
the paper claiming that “A means-end relationship links an end 
to one (of possibly several) means for accomplishing it” (p. 
104). However, according to [25], the three plans of Figure 4 
(get new exclusion set, get new preference set and get 
new location preferences) should all be executed to 
accomplish the replan dynamically goal. This makes it clear 
that the relation between the means, in this case, is an AND-
type relation. This might seem a slight distinction but the 
model designer is hardly the only reader of the model. In fact, 
this is a clear illustration of construct overload (refer to section 
2.E). Consequently, two readers might infer distinct realities 
from the same model. One could even argue that this meaning 
is clear by the textual description. However, written words are 
dubious and it is not possible to guarantee that such a 
description will always accompany the model or that it will be 
transparent and unambiguous. 
Types of means and ends. Figure 4 adds another concern to 
our list. In the iStar wiki, it is stated that only tasks and 
resources may be means to goals; and resources may be means 
to tasks. Such statement only corroborates with the main i* 
reference [20]. But other researchers and practitioners have a 
broader view of the elements that may be considered means to 
tasks than the view advocated in the wiki. In the example of the 
figure, for instance, goals are means to goals: the plan the 
meeting goal is a means to the replan dynamically goal. 
ME-links and OR-decompositions. One may consider that 
the relation means to end must only work from the concrete to 
the abstract. Following this reasoning, one could then affirm 
that it does not make sense to have a goal as means to another 
goal. And in this case, to relate goals, the designer may only 
apply decompositions. However, one may also infer something 
different: suppose that means-end and decomposition between 
goals are only logically differentiated, the former being an 
implication while the latter is a disjunction (in case of OR-
composition) or a conjunction (in case of AND-
decomposition). In case both means-end and decomposition are 
possible between elements of the same kind (e.g. goals), then 
we must distinguish the semantics behind these relations. 
Otherwise, this represents a case of construct redundancy. So, 
while both are equally possible interpretations, it is important 
to clearly define which one is the choice of the i* framework, 
otherwise the understanding of the models may be seriously 
undermined, since the reader will interpret the model according  
                                                           
1 All figures have been designed using the TAOM4E 5.0. This tool 
models Tropos so the syntax of the figures may differ somewhat from 
the original ones. It is also important to say that we only included the 
parts of the models which were relevant to the present discussion. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Means-end link as an XOR-type relation (adapted from [20]) 
 
 
Figure 4.  Means-end links as an AND relation [25]
to his own choice, which may differ from the designer’s 
intentions. 
ME-links and contributions. In Figure 5, one may wonder 
about the differences between ME-links and the contribution 
relation. The build a requirements Tropos model goal is a 
means to the root goal and at the same time contributes to two 
other goals (namely the organization described and the 
understanding customer’s requirements goals). What is the 
difference between means-end and contribution? Does 
contribution infer partial satisfaction? This could be an 
interesting interpretation that in fact, differentiates both 
relations. However, we find in literature that contributions may 
have different values, e.g. make and help
2
. So one may 
wonder if the ME-link equals the make contribution. If so, 
again we have a case of construct redundancy and, 
unavoidably, one will try to ascribe distinct meanings to these 
constructs once they are applied in the same context, which 
could be misleading. 
                                                           
2 The definitions of the values of a contribution link are available in 
the istar wiki at http://istar.rwth-aachen.de/ 
Application of more than one link. Figure 6 presents a case 
in which the same goal (namely the plan the meeting goal) is 
decomposed and, at the same time, has other goals as means. In 
such case, how should we interpret the distinctions between the 
relations? Also, this presents difficulties even in reading the 
model. Shall we start by considering the decomposition and 
then the ME-links (or the other way around, or the order does 
not matter at all)? It is difficult to understand why one should 
consider the relation between plan a meeting (goal) and [plan 
a meeting] automatically (subgoal) and [plan a meeting] 
manually (subgoal) a decomposition while the collect 
requirements and manage conflicts are considered means to 
this same goal. It seems to us that they refer to the same type of 
relation after all. Not having a suggestion on how to 
differentiate such cases, we could consider this yet another case 
of construct redundancy i.e. the existence of two constructs in 




Figure 5.  Having both means-end and contribution links in the same context (adapted from [26]) 
 
Figure 6.  Subgoals and means to the same goal [25]
IV. ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF I* MEANS-END LINKS 
A. Means-end Links from an Ontological Point of View 
Before analyzing i* ME-links, it is important to provide an 
ontological view of the language intentional elements. Reading 
this section requires some basic knowledge about UFO [4][18]. 
We interpret the i* Agent and Role as the concepts of Agent 
and Social Role in UFO (respectively). Position is also 
interpreted as a complex Social Role, since this i* concept is 
defined solely with the purpose of aggregating different roles. 
The abstract Actor concept only captures general relations 
between Agent, Roles, Positions and other modeling elements 
and, thus, it has no specific interpretation in itself. 
We interpret i* Goals as Goals in UFO. Goals in UFO are 
related to sets of intended states of affairs of an agent. The 
relationship between an Agent in i* and a Goal is interpreted 
indirectly by making use of the concept of Intention (or 
Internal Commitment) in UFO, which is a Mental Moment of 
an Agent. As previously discussed, UFO contemplates a 
relation between Situations and Goals such that a Situation (or 
possibly a number of Situations) may satisfy a Goal. In other 
words, since a Goal is a proposition (the propositional content 
of an Intention), we have that a particular set of state of affairs 
can be the truthmaker of that proposition. This set is named the 
goal satisfiability set.  
The concept of Softgoal does not have a uniform treatment 
in the i* community. Sometimes, softgoals are taken to 
represent non-functional requirements. In other places, a 
softgoal is considered as a fuzzy proposition, i.e., one which 
can be partially satisfied (or satisfied to a certain degree, or yet, 
satisficed) by Situations. We here take a different stance, 
reflecting an alternative, but commonly held view that a 
Softgoal is one “subjective to interpretation” and “context-
specific”. Hence, for softgoals, it seems to be impossible to 
eliminate a judging agent (collective or individual) from the 
loop. Thus, instead of considering in the ontology a new 
satisfices relation between Situation and Goal which perhaps 
should contemplate a fuzzy threshold of satisfaction, we take a 
different approach. We consider the relation of satisfaction as a 
ternary relation that can hold between an Agent, a Goal and 
goal satisfiability set. An instance of this relation is derived 
from the belief of an agent that a particular set of situations 
satisfies the goal at hand. Now, in this view, different agents 
can have different beliefs about which sets of situations satisfy 
a given goal. In fact, it is exactly this criterion which seems to 
capture the aforementioned notion of softgoals and its 
differentiae w.r.t. hardgoals: (i) a goal G is said to be a 
hardgoal iff the set of situations that satisfy that goal is 
necessarily shared by all rational agents; (ii) a goal G is said to 
be a softgoal iff it is possible that two rational agents X and Y 
differ in their beliefs to which situations satisfy that goal.  
Seeing the distinction between these subcategories of goals 
under this light, allows us to talk about different levels of 
“softness” between different formulations of a goal. In one end 
of the spectrum, each individual agent would have a different 
belief about which situations satisfy a goal. In the opposite end, 
we have a hardgoal. In between, we can have communities of 
agents (or collective agents) of different sizes which share a 
common belief regarding this set of situations. In the last case, 
this collective agreement can be captured by a Normative 
Description [6]. 
A valid modeling strategy in i* is the association of goals to 
roles. As we have discussed in [5], Social Roles in UFO are 
special types of Social Objects characterized by a number of 
Social Moment Universals (Social Commitments and Social 
Claims). They are typically defined through a Normative 
Description which is accepted in the context of a certain Social 
Agent (e.g., an Organization, a Social Community or a 
Society). Thus, when accepting to play a Social Role, one is 
making a meta-commitment of commiting to perform all tasks 
and adopt the goals associated with the role [27]. To cite one 
example, take the role of President, defined by a certain 
Constitution. By accepting to play this role, an agent commits 
to adopt all goals defined for this position. Moreover, in this 
situation, it is possible that some of the agent’s prior goals 
become conflicting with those adopted via the commitment to 
the social role. For instance, while being President, one cannot 
work simultaneously for a private company and one cannot 
appear in public places without proper security measures. As 
pointed out by [28], an agent’s autonomy within social context 
is restricted by the set of meta-commitments and claims she 
has, as a result of playing a specific role. 
The mapping of the Task concept from i* to some UFO 
concept is established in a direct manner. Task in i* is a 
specific way of doing something to satisfy some Goal (or 
satisfacing some Softgoal). From the UFO ontology, we have 
that an Action (instance of an Action Universal) is an 
intentional event performed by agents with the purpose of 
achieving goals. Consequently, the i* Task construct can be 
interpreted as an Action Universal. It is important to emphasize 
that an Action may be either atomic or complex, mapping 
respectively to a Task as a single action or as a set of actions. 
The concept of Resource has been interpreted as a Resource 
in UFO, i.e., as a Non-agentive Substantial (or Object) which 
participates in a Complex Action. A Complex Action is a 
composition of at least two basic Actions or Participations. 
Participations can themselves be intentional (i.e., Actions) or 
non-intentional Events. 
B. Ontological Analysis of the i* Means-end Relation 
We first analyze ME-links between a Task and a Goal. In 
i*, the ME-link is a ternary relation indexed to an Agent’s 
(subjective) point of view. However, as stated above, we 
consider in UFO that all agents have a consensual opinion 
regarding the satisfaction of a hardgoal. In this sense, we can 
exclude the agent’s point of view from the definition of this 
ME-link, simply interpreting it as: a Task T is a means to a 
Goal G (G being the end) iff one or more executions of T (i.e., 
action instances of type T) produce a post-situation which 
satisfies G. 
Similarly, the ME-link can also be defined between a 
Resource type and a Goal and between a Resource type and a 
Task. The former mode of this relation can be interpreted as 
follows: a Resource type is a means to a Task (end) iff every 
Action instance of that Task has as part a Participation of a 
Resource of that type. In contrast, the ME-link between a 
Resource and a Goal should be interpreted as: a Resource type 
R is a means to a Goal G (G being end) iff every Action which 
satisfies that Goal has as part a Participation of a Resource of 
that type. By this definition, it is clear that, even if not explicit 
in the model, there is always a Task T (Action in UFO) which 
has as part a Participation of Resource R.  In other words, 
Resource R is a means to the hidden Task T, which is a means 
to the Goal G.  
In the case of a Softgoal, we should in fact consider the 
perspective (i.e., belief) of a particular agent, since its 
satisfaction set is not a consensus. Thus, we define the ME-link 
between a Task and a Softgoal as follows: a Task T is a means 
to a Softgoal S (S being the end) in the point of view of Agent 
A iff one or more executions of T produce a post-situation 
which A believes to satisfy S, or in other words, a post-
situation included in the goal satisfiability set of A. 
C. Resolving the Dispute Regarding Means-end and         
OR-decomposition 
As already mentioned in section 3.1, the i* dialects do not 
agree on the use of the ME-link and the OR-decomposition. 
Having two distinct relations that model the same phenomenon 
in the world is usually not a good practice, because, in general, 
the modeler will attempt to ascribe different meanings to each 
of them, or else randomly choose one or another when 
modeling such phenomenon. Thus, we believe it is in the 
interest of the i* community to reach an agreement, having one 
uniform view in this regard.  
In [29], we present two possibilities: 1) maintaining only 
the ME-link and excluding the OR-decomposition from the i* 
core; and 2) having both ME-link and OR-decomposition, but 
having a clear semantic distinction between them.  In this 
paper, we prefer to take a position, showing our preference to 
the second option. 
Although leading to a more complex language, we argue 
that this choice favors expressivity. In this case, the 
aforementioned ontological definitions are applied if we 
consider means and ends of distinct types. And Means-end 
relation is seen as an implication, in which if the means is 
satisfied, then the end is also satisfied. Among intentional 
elements of the same type we consider OR-decomposition 
only, e.g. an OR-decomposition of goal G0 into subgoals 
G1…Gn should be interpreted as:          (G0 ↔ (G1  G2  …  
Gn)). Thus, for the case of goals,     OR-decomposition 
relations reflect logical relations between propositions. These 
distinctions are shown in Table III.  
The distinctions between Means-End and Or-
decomposition may help us interpret the model of Figure 6. In 
that case, both collect requirements and manage conflict 
should be modeled as tasks, as Means-end is no longer allowed 
between constructs of the same type. In this case, the 
satisfaction of the tasks implies the accomplishment of the 
goal. On the other hand, automatically and manually are 
alternative ways to accomplish the plan the meeting goal, 
which is correctly captured by the interpretation of Or-
decomposition between goals as a goals disjunction. 
TABLE III.  CONSIDERING BOTH MEANS-END LINKS AND                          
OR-DECOMPOSITION 





 T R G SG 
T Or-D --- ME ME 
R ME Or-D ME ME 
G --- --- Or-D --- 
SG --- --- --- Or-D 
 
D. Distinguishing between two types of Means-end relations 
There is still one pending issue, which relates to Figures 3 
and 4 of the previous section. At this point, viewing a Means-
end as an implication relation is not enough. There is still a 
conflict overload, since nothing is said if all means should be 
satisfied in order to satisfy the end (AND relation between 
means) or if the satisfaction of only one of the means is enough 
to satisfy the end (XOR relation between means). In order to 
correct this overload, the possibilities are: a) creating distinct 
arrows to denote each possibility or b) annotating the arrow 
with an AND or an XOR to make this difference explicit. The 
decision on one solution or another requires further 
investigation and here we just leave the issue open. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The i* framework is recognized as a distinguishing 
modeling framework for requirements analysis and 
organizational modeling. Some of the benefits of the use of i* 
are [20]: (i) allowing a deep understanding of the 
organizational member’s intentions and motivation; (ii) 
providing traceability between system’s functionalities and 
requirements; and (iii) allowing the analysis of alternative ways 
a requirement may be accomplished. However, in order to 
fulfill its promises, the constructs of the i* language must be 
well understood so as to allow consistent use. Moreover, it is 
desirable that the learning curve to apprehend the semantics 
and syntax of these modeling elements is kept reasonable. 
Otherwise, the effort for understanding the model or for 
learning how to design one will not justify its practical use. 
We have seen that, in industrial practice, designers tend to 
apply a subset of the framework’s constructs despite the effort 
of many researchers in extending the language to capture more 
complex phenomenon [14]. This trend also justifies the 
endeavor we have started in this work, by providing a clearer 
understanding of the i* core constructs, grounding the 
semantics of these constructs in a formal theoretical body.  
In this paper, we started by looking at the means-end 
relation and related concepts. We presented the results of a 
survey, showing a few distinctions found in among the i* 
dialects in respect to this construct. We also illustrated some of 
the different existing interpretations by showing some 
examples collected from literature. And we finally provided an 
ontological analysis of this construct by the use of the UFO 
ontology as a reference model. 
Our work offers several opportunities to other research 
lines. For instance, Moody et al. [30] have largely discussed 
about the adequacy of the current form that the i* concrete 
syntax (i.e. its visual notation), identifying some situations that 
pose problems that somehow relate to the ones mentioned here 
(e.g., construct overload). The existence of an ontological 
foundation is a necessary input to design a concrete syntax, 
solving this kind of problems as recognized by Moody et al. 
themselves but also as discussed in [4]. 
Our subsequent steps in this research include debating the 
present definitions with the community of researchers and 
users of i*, thus brushing them up. Moreover, we intend to visit 
the remaining constructs of the language, following the same 
approach to ground them in the UFO foundational ontology.  
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